Showing posts with label Telecommunications Industry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Telecommunications Industry. Show all posts

Comverse Technology ... Is It Really That Simple?

    Question: "If you did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year.

    Answer by Mark Mendelsohn, former FCPA chief DOJ: "If the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal charge or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases."

    Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 Corporate Crime Reporter 35, September 10, 2010.

    "... [T]he S.E.C.’s practice of permitting defendants to neither admit nor deny the charges against them remains pervasive, presumably for no better reason than that it makes the settling of cases easier."

    U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.) in SEC v. Vitesse Semiconducter Corp., March 21, 2010.


    ****

    A U.S. company has a subsidiary A.

    Subsidiary A has a subsidiary - subsidiary B.

    Subsidiary B engaged an agent who made improper payments partially facilitated by subsidiary's B's inflated commission payments to him.

    There is no allegation that Subsidiary A knew about the payments.

    There is no allegation that the U.S. company knew about the payments.

    But subsidiary B's books, records and accounts are incorporated into the books, records and accounts of the U.S. company for purposes of financial reporting.

    These are the essential facts from last week's FCPA enforcement action against Comverse Technology Inc. - "a world leader in multimedia telecommunications applications".

    The enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was $2.8 million ($1.2 million criminal fine via a DOJ non prosecution agreement; $1.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest via a SEC settled complaint).

    Is it really that simple?

    Some have suggested that Comverse received "lenient" treatment (see here). Yet, it is questionable whether Comverse would have faced any criminal liability should the DOJ have been required to satisfy its high burden of proof in court.

    Yet, FCPA enforcement actions like Comverse seem to be becoming norm.

    DOJ

    The DOJ enforcement action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement, meaning there was not, and will never, be judiciary scrutiny of the DOJ's enforcement theory.

    The NPA (here) begins as follows.

    The DOJ "will not criminally prosecute Comverse Technology, Inc. ("CTI"), Comverse Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of CTI ("Comverse Inc."), and the subsidiaries of Comverse Inc., including Comverse Ltd. (collectively referred to as Comverse) for any crimes ... related to Comverse's knowing violation of the books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ... arising from and related to Comverse's failure accurately to record certain improper payments made by employees of Comverse Ltd. and certain subsidiaries of Comverse Ltd. and a third party agent from 2003 to 2006."

    According to the NPA, Comverse Inc. was wholly-owned subsidiary of CTI and Comverse Ltd., an Israeli company based in Tel Aviv, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Comverse Inc.

    The NPA has a term of two years and Comverse admitted, accepted, and acknowledged responsibility for the below described conduct. As is typical in FCPA NPAs or DPAs, Comverse agreed "not to make any public statement contradicting" the information below.

    The conduct at issue focuses on monthly retainer fees paid by Comverse Ltd. to Agent G (an Israeli citizen engaged by Comverse Ltd. as an independent consultant with a particular focus on Greece) and commissions paid to Agent G on purchase orders. According to the NPA, "Agent G would keep 15% of the total commission, and the remaining 85% was used to make improper payments."

    According to the NPA, "between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Ltd. made approximately $536,000 in cash payments to Corporation H [a Cyprus-based company created by Agent G at the direction of Comverse Ltd. employees to facilitate the payment of cash to representatives of certain Comverse Ltd. customers in exchange for securing purchase orders] with the intent that the money woudl be passed on to individuals connected to OTE, including employees of OTE's subsidiaries Cosmote, Cosmofon, and Cosmorom, in order to obtain purchase orders from those companies for Comverse Ltd. products and services, resulting in approximately $1.25 million in adjusted operating income."

    OTE?

    That would be the "Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. - a telecommunications provider controlled and partially owned by the Greek Government." According to the NPA, "the Greek Government was OTE's largest single shareholder and maintained an interest in over one-third of OTE's issued share capital."

    The DOJ agreed to resolve the enforcement action via a NPA "based, in part, on the following factors: (a) Comverse's timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the facts" [described above]; (b) Comverse's full cooperation with the Department and the [SEC]; and (c) the remedial efforts already undertaken and to be undertaken by Comverse."

    The DOJ release (here) states as follows. "The [NPA] recognizes the company’s thorough self-investigation and the results of its investigation, voluntary disclosure of the underlying conduct, and full cooperation with the department. CTI has also undertaken extensive remedial efforts and overhauled its overall compliance culture, including through the implementation of mandatory training programs focused on anti-corruption and the use of third-party agents and intermediaries, as well as more rigorous accounting controls for the approval of third-party payments. As a result of these mitigating factors, the department has agreed not to prosecute CTI or its subsidiaries for failing to maintain accurate books and records, provided that CTI satisfies its obligations under the agreement for a period of two years. Those obligations include ongoing cooperation, payment of the $1.2 million penalty, and the continued implementation of rigorous internal controls."

    SEC

    The SEC's civil complaint (here) is based on the same core conduct described above.

    The complaint alleges, in summary fashion, as follows.

    "Between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Technology, Inc. (“Comverse”) violated the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”) when its Israeli operating subsidiary, Comverse Limited (“Comverse Limited”), engaged in a scheme to make improper payments to obtain or retain business."

    "In order to facilitate and conceal the payments, Comverse Limited employed a third-party agent (the “Agent”) to establish an offshore entity in Cyprus which, in turn, funneled the improper payments to Comverse Limited’s customers. Employees of Comverse Limited made payments to the Cyprus entity and, after taking 15% off the top of these payments, the Agent paid or facilitated the payment of the remaining 85% to Comverse Limited’s customers in the form of cash bribes."

    "Comverse Limited did not accurately record these improper payments in its books and records, which, in turn, caused them to be improperly classified in Comverse’s consolidated financial statements. Comverse failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions at all levels of the organization were recorded properly."

    Specifically, the SEC alleged as follows.

    "Between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Limited made improper payments to employees connected to OTE in order to obtain or retain business with OTE. The scheme originated in Comverse Limited's EMEA (Europe, Middle East, and Africa) sales division and the improper payments were inaccurately recorded on Comverse Limited's books and records, which, in turn, were consolidated with Comverse's financial results."

    "Between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Limited, using [Corporation H], made improper payments totaling approximately $536,000 to individuals connected to OTE, including employees of OTE's subsidiaries Cosmote, Cosmofon, and Cosmorom to obtain or retain OTE's business. The improper payments resulted in $1.2 million of improper benefit to Comverse Limited, which flowed through to Comverse."

    As to internal controls, the SEC alleged as follows. "During the relevant time period, neither Comverse nor Comverse Limited had a process, formal or otherwise, for conducting due diligence of third-party agents or for the independent review of third-party agent contracts outside of the sales departments." The SEC further alleged as follows. "At the time of the conduct, while Comverse did have an omnibus anti-corruption policy that prohibited improper payments to government-affiliated third parties and others, Comverse did not widely circulate this policy and provided no training on it to any employees."

    As to books and records, the SEC alleged as follows. "Comverse Limited falsified its books and records by characterizing and recording the bribes as legitimate sales commissions, thereby failing accurately to reflect the payments and their purpose. These improper expenses, in turn, were consolidated into Comverse's financial records."

    Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Comverse with FCPA books and records and internal control violations.

    As noted in the SEC release (here) without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Comverse consented "to a conduct-based injunction that prohibits Comverse from having books and records that do not accurately reflect, or from having internal controls that do not prevent or detect, any illegal payments made to obtain or retain business." In addition, Comverse consented to pay $1,249,614 in disgorgement and $358,887 in prejudgment interest.

    Daniel Horwitz (Lankler and Carragher - see here) represented Comverse.

    The company's 8-K filing on April 7th stated as follows. " As originally disclosed by the Company on March 16, 2009, the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company conducted its own internal investigation into such payments. The Audit Committee found that the conduct at issue did not involve the Company’s executive officers."

    The company's 10-K filing on January 25, 2011 suggests that the company's internal investigation was prompted by a whistleblower complaint and the filing details the company's remedial actions in connection with the investigation. According to the filing "the Company recorded charges of $2.9 million associated with [the FCPA matter] during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2009." The company has not yet disclosed what its fees and expenses were during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010.

    *****

    Another interesting item from Comverse's SEC filings. "For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010, approximately one quarter of Verint's [Comverse's majority-owned publicly traded subsidiary] business was generated from contracts with various governments around the world, including federal, state, and local government agencies."

Post Title

Comverse Technology ... Is It Really That Simple?


Post URL

https://manufacturing-holdings.blogspot.com/2011/04/comverse-technology-is-it-really-that.html


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DOJ Charges Two Executives In Hondutel Matter

    In April 2009, Latin Node, Inc. ("Latin Node"), a privately-held telecommunication services company headquartered in Miami, pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions in connection with improper payments made to "foreign officials" in Honduras and Yemen. (See here). The criminal information (here) details Latin Node's efforts to obtain and retain business with Hondutel (the Honduran government-owned telecommunications company).

    Yesterday, the DOJ announced (see here) the unsealing of a 19 count criminal indictment against Jorge Granados and Manuel Caceres.

    According to the indictment (here), Granados "was the founder, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Latin Node" between 1999 and 2007. During this time period, Granados, a U.S. citizen, had authority to set company policy, contract with telecommunications companies, hire and fire employees, set sales prices, and approve sales practices in foreign countries." Caceres was a senior executive of Latin Node from 2004 to 2007, holding such titles as Vice President of Business Development. The indictment alleges that Caceres, a citizen of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., was responsible for, among other things, developing Latin Node's business in Honduras.

    The indictment centers on an "interconnection agreement" between Latin Node and Hondutel "the wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Honduras, established under Honduran law and headquartered in Tegucigalpa, Honduras." According to the indictment, Hondutel's operations "were overseen by another Honduran government entity, Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones."

    According to the indictment, "almost immediately after winning the interconnection agreement with Hondutel, Latin Node executives realized that Latin Node needed to obtain a reduction in the Termination Rates in order to be more competitive in the Honduran telecommunications market." The indictment charges that "Latin Node executives also learned that Official 1 [a senior Hondutel executive with broad decision-making authority and influence over telecommunications contracts with private service providers] was considering whether to rescind Hondutel's interconnection agreement with Latin Node."

    The indictment charges one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, twelve counts of FCPA anti-bribery violations, one count of money laundering conspiracy, and five counts of money laundering.

    According to the indictment, the "purpose of the conspiracy was to obtain from Hondutel business advantages for Latin Node including, but not limited to, preferred telecommunications rates, retaining the interconnection agreement, and continued operation in Honduras despite late payments to Hondutel, by paying bribes to Honduran government officials, including to officers and employees of the Government of Honduras and of Hondutel ...".

    Among other things, the indictment alleges that Granados and Caceres, and others, "would and did offer to pay, promise to pay, and authorize the payments of bribes, directly and indirectly to and for the benefit of Official 1, Official 2 [an attorney in the Hondutel legal department who worked directly for Official 1], and Official 3 [a Minister in the Honduran Government who was a member of Hondutel's Board of Directors], in exchange for these Officials' agreements to secure lower rates and other benefits for Latin Node under the interconnection agreement with Hondutel." The indictment charges that Granados and Caceres, and others, "would and did wire and cause to be wired certain bribe payments from Latin Node's bank accounts in Miami-Dade County, Florida, to the bank accounts designated by Official 1, Official 2 and Official 3."

    According to the DOJ release, "between September 2006 and June 2007, the defendants allegedly paid more than $500,000 in brobes to the officials, concealing many of the payments by laundering the money through Latin Node subsidiaries in Guatemala and to accounts in Honduras controlled by the Honduran government officials."

    As noted in the DOJ release, in early 2007, eLandia International Inc., (here) announced an agreement to acquire Latin Node." "The indictment alleges that the defendants took additional measures to conceal the illicit payments during the acquisition due diligence process."

    The DOJ release further notes that the April 2009 resolution with Latin Node resulted from the "actions of eLandia in disclosing potential FCPA violations to the department after eLandia's acquisition of Latin Node and discovery of the improper payments."

    ***

    Did the Latin Node enforcement action contribute to a coup? That is the question asked in this interesting piece by Gregory Paw (Pepper Hamilton).

Post Title

DOJ Charges Two Executives In Hondutel Matter


Post URL

https://manufacturing-holdings.blogspot.com/2010/12/doj-charges-two-executives-in-hondutel.html


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Disconnected ... Another Telecommunications Company Settles An FCPA Enforcement Action

    Yesterday, Veraz Networks, Inc. (see here) joined a long list of telecommunications companies to recently settle an FCPA enforcement action. Veraz, a California-based telecommunications provider, went public in April 2007 and sells its telecommunication products through both direct and indirect sales channels with a majority of its revenue coming from sales outside of the U.S.

    Other telecommunications companies, or individuals employed in that industry, to recently resolve FCPA enforcement actions include: UTStarcom (see here and here for the enforcement action), Latin Node, Inc. (see here for the enforcement action), Lucent Technologies (see here and here for the enforcement action), Siemens (in part, see here for the enforcement action), various individuals in connection with the Haiti Teleco matter (see here for the enforcement action), and various employees of ITXC Corporation (see here for the enforcement action). Pending FCPA enforcement actions against telecommunications companies presumably include: Magygar Telekom (see here) and Global Crossing Limited (see here).

    That's a long list.

    Back to Veraz.

    According to the SEC release (see here), Veraz violated the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions in connection with "improper payments made by Veraz to foreign officials in China and Vietnam after the company went public in 2007."

    The SEC complaint (see here) alleges that "from 2007 to 2008, Veraz resellers, consultants, and employees made and offered payments to employees of government-controlled telecommunications companies in China and Vietnam with the purpose and effect of improperly influencing these foreign officials to award or continue to do business with Veraz." According to the complaint, a Veraz supervisor referred to certain of these payments as the "gift scheme." The complaint further alleges that "Veraz failed to accurately record these improper payments on the Company's books and records, and failed to implement or maintain a system of effective internal accounting controls to prevent them in violation of the FCPA [...] and to put in place internal controls that are reasonably designed to ensure that their books and records are accurate."

    The SEC's sparse factual allegations fall under two headings: "Veraz Made Improper Payments to Chinese Government Officials" and "Veraz Made Improper Payments to Vietnamese Government Officials."

    As to payments to "Chinese Government Officials," the SEC alleges that Veraz engaged a consultant in China to assist Veraz sell products "to a telecommunications company controlled by the government of China." The complaint further alleges that the consultant "provided approximately $4,500 worth of gifts to officials" of the telecommunications company "in an attempt to secure a business deal for Veraz." The complaint further alleges that the consultant "also offered a separate improper payment to officials" at the telecommunications company "to secure a deal for Veraz valued at approximately $233,000." According to the complaint, "Veraz discovered this improper offer of payment prior to receiving any money from the transaction and cancelled the sale."

    As to payments to "Vietnamese Government Officials," the SEC alleges that "Veraz sold products to a telecommunications company controlled by the government of Vietnam through a Singapore-based reseller." According to the complaint, a "Veraz employee, through the Singapore-based reseller, at times made or offered illicit payments to the CEO" of the telecommunications company "in order to win business for Veraz." The complaint further alleges that Veraz "approved of and reimbursed its employee for questionable expenses related" to the telecommunications company "including gifts and entertainment" for employees of the company and "flowers for the wife of the CEO" of the company.

    In both instances, according to the complaint: (i) Veraz did not make or keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflected the improper gifts or payments provided by Veraz; and (ii) Veraz failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls to prevent or detect violations of the FCPA.

    Based on these allegations, the SEC charged Veraz with violating the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions.

    According to the SEC's release, Veraz, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, consented to entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining Veraz from future FCPA violations and ordering Veraz to pay a $300,000 civil penalty.

    In an article to be published later this summer titled "The Facade of FCPA Enforcement," I highlight four pillars which contribute to the facade of FCPA enforcement.

    The first pillar highlights the frequency in which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved based on uninformative, bare-bones, and legal conclusory statements of facts or allegations. Check as to the Veraz enforcement action. Just who were those Chinese and Vietnamese Government officials? The SEC complaint contains these wonderfully descriptive allegations: "a telecommunications company controlled by the government of China" and a "telecommunications company controlled by the government of Vietnam." What was the nature of the "illicit payments" made or offered to the CEO of the Vietnamese telecommunications company and what were the "questionable expenses" related to the same company? The complaint does not elaborate.

    The second pillar highlights the increasing and alarming trend of FCPA enforcement actions being resolved based on tenuous, dubious and untested legal theories. Check as to the Veraz enforcement action. True, the enforcement action does not allege antibribery violations, but let's face it, if Veraz's books and records did not adequately reflect sales and marketing expenses associated with domestic customers and if Veraz did not have sufficient internal controls to prevent and detect such expenses, we would not be reading about this case as an "FCPA enforcement action" even though such conduct would similarly violate the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions. Rather, this is an FCPA enforcement action (in the traditional sense) because the improperly recorded payments were directed at "foreign officials" - so alleges the SEC under the theory, never accepted by a court, that employees of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises are "foreign officials" under the FCPA.

    The third pillar highlights highlights the opaque nature of FCPA enforcement and how similar enforcement actions, based on the government's own allegations, are resolved with materially different charges and penalties. Check as to the Veraz enforcement action. If ever there were carbon copy FCPA enforcement actions, it would seem to be Veraz, UTStarcom and Lucent. All principally involved providing things of value to Chinese "foreign officials" (employees of alleged state-owned enterprises). One would expect then that the charges would be similar as well. Wrong. Veraz appears to be only an SEC enforcement action charging only FCPA books and records and internal control violations. UTStarcom involved a DOJ non-prosecution agreement and an SEC enforcement action charging FCPA antibribery as well as books and records and internal control violations. Lucent also involved a DOJ non-prosecution agreement and an SEC enforcement action charging only FCPA books and records and internal control violations. Thus, three similar cases resolved three distinct ways.

    [The fourth pillar highlights how seemingly clear-cut instances of corporate bribery and corruption (per the government's own allegations) are resolved without FCPA antibribery charges. Veraz is not BAE, Siemens, or Daimler - and thus this pillar is of little significance here].

    One final point demonstrated by the Veraz enforcement action: resolution fines/penalties represent merely the "tip of the iceberg" in terms of the costs associated with an FCPA inquiry.

    The final fine amount, $300,000, is 1/10 the amount of expenses incurred by the company in connection with the SEC investigation. As stated in the company's most recent 10-Q filing (May 2010) (see here) "as of March 31, 2010, the Company has incurred expenses relating to the SEC investigation of approximately $3 million."

    No wonder Forbes (see here) recently termed the increase in FCPA enforcement the "bribery racket." No wonder the Wall Street Journal Law Blog (see here) recently posed the question - "is the FCPA Just a Full-Employment Act for the Private Bar?"

Post Title

Disconnected ... Another Telecommunications Company Settles An FCPA Enforcement Action


Post URL

https://manufacturing-holdings.blogspot.com/2010/06/disconnected-another-telecommunications.html


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