Showing posts with label Sovereign Wealth Funds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sovereign Wealth Funds. Show all posts

The U.K. Bribery Act Goes Live

    At the time of this post, the U.K. Bribery Act has been live for about ten hours, yet there has not been an enforcement action. Given that the Act is not retrospective and applies only to bribes paid after July 1st, this is hardly surprising, but I hope you appreciate the Friday humor.

    U.K. corporates and others subject to the Bribery Act are doing business around the world, including in high-risk jurisdictions, and a healthy dose of corporate hospitality is no doubt occurring at Wimbledon. In other words, the world has not changed.

    Today, of course, is the day the U.K. Bribery Act finally goes live.

    As explained is this U.K. Ministry of Justice circular, "the Bribery Act replaces the offences at common law and under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (known collectively as the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916) with a new consolidated scheme of bribery offences."

    The FCPA-like provision of the Bribery Act is Section 6 described in the circular as follows. "Section 6 is designed to deal with the corruption of decision making in publicly funded business transactions through the personal enrichment of foreign public officials by those seeking business opportunities. The offence is committed where a person offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to a foreign public official with the intention of influencing the official in the performance of his or her official functions. There must also be an intention to obtain or retain business or a business advantage on the part of the perpetrator. However, the offence is not committed where the official is permitted or required by the applicable written law to be influenced by the advantage."

    As to corporate liability, the circular states as follows. "The Bribery Act includes a new form of corporate criminal liability where there is a failure to prevent bribery perpetrated on behalf of a “relevant commercial organisation” (Section 7). This new corporate liability for bribery [...] does not in any way change the existing common law principle governing the liability of corporate bodies for criminal offences that require the prosecution to prove a fault element or ‘mens rea’ in addition to a conduct element. This common law principle, sometimes referred to as the “identification principle”, will therefore continue to operate so that where there is evidence to prove that a person who is properly regarded as representing the “directing mind” of the body in question possessed the necessary fault element required for the offence charged the corporate body may be proceeded against."

    As to the Section 7 offense, the circular states as follows. "The offence at section 7 of the Act creates a new form of corporate criminal liability. The offence applies only to a “relevant commercial organisation” as defined at section 7(5) and focuses on a failure by such an organisation to prevent a person “associated with” it from committing a section 1 or 6 bribery offence in order to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for that organisation. It creates direct rather than vicarious liability and its commission does not amount to the commission of a substantive bribery offence under section 1 or 6. A commercial organisation will have a full defence if it can show that despite a particular case of bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place designed to prevent persons associated with it from bribing."

    As Michael Volkov (here) nicely stated - "The longest pre-game show in history is drawing to a close. The new world will shortly be upon us. Will the UK Bribery Act be a game-changer or will it fizzle out like Y2K? Everyone has their predictions; everyone has their focus and emphasis."

    Here is my two cents.

    As with any new law, there is likely to be a learning phase for both the enforcement agencies and those subject to the law. That was certainly the case in the U.S. in the years following passage of the FCPA in 1977. Thus, it very well may be the case that there are no enforcement actions for some time (recognizing that it often takes a few years from beginning of an inquiry to resolution of an action). Thus the greatest immediate impact of the Bribery Act is sure to be the compliance ethic it inspires. I expect that the enforcement actions that may develop over time to focus on egregious instances of corporate conduct on which no reasonable minds would disagree. I do not get the sense, based on public comments of the Ministry of Justice and the Serious Fraud Office, that the envelope will be pushed too far in the early years of the Bribery Act.

    *****

    See here for the text of Richard Alderman's (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) recent speech on the Bribery Act.

    In a signature departure from U.S. enforcement policy concerning merger and aquisition issues, Alderman stated as follows. "I know that there are many occasions when an acquiring company takes over a target company and discovers either before or after the event that there are serious problems about corrupt activities in the target company. My view is that when an ethical acquiring company identifies these issues, then it is in everyone's interest that that acquiring company gets on and sorts out the problems that it has inherited. I have difficulty in seeing that any SFO investigation at the corporate level would be justified although I would have to consider carefully the position of any individuals." (As highlighted in this recent post, several FCPA enforcement actions have been based on successor liability theories).

    *****

    In this speech, Alderman stated the following regarding the "foreign public official" term in the Bribery Act.

    "Who then is a foreign public official? This is the subject of litigation at the moment in the US and I am following this with interest. The test I use is one that was set out by the OECD in the commentary on the OECD Convention. What we look at is whether or not the foreign State is in a position to influence the foreign company. We therefore look at the relationship between the company and the State to see whether effectively this commercial organisation is being run by the State. This can lead us into some tricky areas. We have received questions about banking officials in countries where the State has a very major interest in the Bank and exercises that interest very actively. Are those officials foreign public officials? Our view is that in those circumstances the individual is likely to be a foreign public official. On the other hand if the State has a major interest but does not control the operations of the Bank, then I think we could have a different situation."

    *****

    Keeping with today's U.K. theme, earlier this week Bloomberg reported (here) that the SFO is assisting the SEC "on inquiries involving financial institutions and whether bribes were paid in transactions with sovereign wealth funds."

    As previously reported by the Wall Street Journal (see here) the SEC is "examining whether Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and other financial firms might have violated bribery laws in dealings with Libya's sovereign wealth fund." The SFO's inquiry appears to be related to HSBC Holdings Plc's interactions with Libya's sovereign wealth fund.

    Other financial services firms that have reportedly received letters of inquiry from the SEC include Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup.

    *****

    A good holiday weekend to all.

Post Title

The U.K. Bribery Act Goes Live


Post URL

https://manufacturing-holdings.blogspot.com/2011/07/uk-bribery-act-goes-live.html


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"Foreign Official" Brain Teasers

    Two "foreign official" brain teasers are highlighted below.

    One touches upon sovereign wealth funds, the other a Chinese state-owned enterprise (as well as sovereign wealth funds). Both are based on recent events.

    *****

    A prior post discussed sovereign wealth funds and the FCPA (see here).

    I noted that while no FCPA enforcement action has yet involved a sovereign wealth fund, such funds and the investments these funds make in private companies, are clearly on the radar screen of the enforcement agencies as both DOJ and SEC officials have in the past publicly stated that sovereign wealth funds pose FCPA risks because the funds are government owned (see here and here).

    The next frontier of the enforcement agencies often times aggressive and dubious "foreign official" interpretation may thus be application to the investments made by sovereign wealth funds.

    According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, Chesapeake Energy Corp. (here) recently sold $900 million in preferred stock to a group of investors. Among others, Chesapeake sold shares to China Investment Corp. (a Chinese government sovereign wealth fund - here), Korea Investment Corp. (a South Korea government sovereign wealth fund - here) and Temasek Holdings (Singapore's sovereign wealth fund - here). For good measure, Abu Dhabi Investment Council (Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth fund - here) also invested in Chesapeake.

    What would it take for Chesapeake employees to become Chinese "foreign officials"? A majority investment by China Investment Corp.? What if the investment was not a majority investment, but China Investment Corp. exercised veto rights over certain business decisions?

    If not Chinese "foreign officials," what would it take for Chesapeake employees to become Korean "foreign officials." What if Korea Investment Corp. had the opportunity to appoint Chesapeake board members?

    If not Korean "foreign officials," what fact or factors would it take for Chesapeake employees to become Singapore or Abu Dhabi "foreign officials"?

    *****

    Numerous prior posts have discussed Chinese state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") and the enforcement agencies interpretation (one that has never been accepted by a court) that employees of alleged Chinese SOEs are Chinese "foreign officials" because the SOE is an alleged "instrumentality" of the Chinese government - notwithstanding the fact that it has publicly traded shares and other attributes of private ownership.

    One of the largest ever IPO's is expected to soon price.

    It involves Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. (a Chinese government owned bank - here) and its attempts to raise US$20 billion - $30 billion by listing shares on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges.

    According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, Qatar Investment Authority (Qatar's sovereign wealth fund - here) is expected to invest US$2.8 billion in the offering. Kuwait Investment Authority (Kuwait's sovereign wealth fund - here) is expected to invest $800 million. Other investors expected to participate in the deal include Temasek Holdings (Singapore's sovereign wealth fund).

    Can an entity such as Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. truly be considered a Chinese government instrumentality when it has publicly traded shares and multi-billion and million dollar investments from other nation's sovereign wealth funds? At what point could Agricultural Bank of China employees cease being Chinese "foreign officials" and become Qatar or Kuwait "foreign officials"?

    It is not just sovereign wealth funds that are planning to make massive investments in Agricultural Bank of China. According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, Archer Daniels Midland Co. (here) is also expected to invest $100 million to $200 million in the IPO.

    Can Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. truly be considered a Chinese government instrumentality while at the same time securing a multi-million dollar investment from a US food giant?

    *****

    A recent article by Samuel Rubenfeld (Dow Jones News Service) titled "To Comply with Bribery Laws, Companies Must Decide Who's 'Official'" explores the meaning of the FCPA's "foreign official" element. In the article, a DOJ spokeswoman merely referred to the statutory definition of "foreign official" in the FCPA as her agency's comment for the article.

    The FCPA defines "foreign official" as follows:

    “Foreign official” means any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization."

    So these aren't brain teasers after all, the DOJ apparently feels that the answer is found in the statute itself.

Post Title

"Foreign Official" Brain Teasers


Post URL

https://manufacturing-holdings.blogspot.com/2010/06/official-brain-teasers.html


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Sovereign Wealth Funds and the FCPA

    Numerous previous posts have discussed the enforcement agencies' interpretation of the key "foreign official" element of an FCPA antibribery violation and how that interpretation includes employees (regardless of title or position) of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises ("SOEs") - even if the SOE has attributes of a purely commercial enterprise such as publicy traded stock. Part of this interpretation includes the notion that all employees of SOE subsidiaries are also "foreign officials" under the FCPA.

    This interpretation has never been accepted by a court, yet it remains a central feature of FCPA enforcement.

    Two-thirds of 2009 FCPA enforcement actions against business entities involved, in whole or in part, "foreign officials" under this dubious legal interpretation.

    The most aggressive application of the enforcement agencies' “foreign official” interpretation was in the KBR / Halliburton enforcement action (here and here) in which the enforcement agencies alleged that officers and employees of Nigeria LNG Limited ("NLNG") were "foreign officials" despite the fact that NLNG is owned 51% by a consortium of private multinational oil companies – Shell, Total, and Eni (see here).

    In other words, even if an entity is undeniably majority owned by private companies, the enforcement agencies will not retreat from the dubious legal interpretation that employees of that entity are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.

    I've noted before that this dubious legal interpretation can lead to strange results such as employees of a Delaware company perhaps being Venezuelan "foreign officials" (see here) and an American citizen perhaps being a Dubai "foreign official" (see here).

    Strange and unexpected results can also occur when applying the enforcement agencies' "foreign official" interpretation to so-called sovereign wealth funds (i.e. foreign government owned investment vehicles).

    While no FCPA enforcement action has yet involved a sovereign wealth fund, such funds and the investments these funds make in private companies, are clearly on the radar screen of the enforcement agencies as both DOJ and SEC officials have in the past publicly stated that sovereign wealth funds pose FCPA risks because the funds are government owned (see here and here).

    The next frontier of the enforcement agencies' dubious "foreign official" interpretation may thus be application to the investments made by sovereign wealth funds.

    Against this backdrop, it is interesting to take a peek inside one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, China Investment Corporation (here), "an investment institution established as a wholly state-owned company under the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China and headquartered in Beijing."

    According to CIC's recent SEC filing (here), the exact reason for that filing appears unclear (see here), CIC owns equity stakes in more than 60 U.S. corporations including Abbott Labs, Apple, Bank of America, Coca-Cola, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Metlife, Pfizer, Pulte Homes, Visa, and Wells Fargo.

    At present, CIC's holdings are small, minority stakes. However, if CIC's holdings grow, would Coca-Cola, Wells Fargo, etc. employees be considered Chinese "foreign officials?" Can it truly be the case that such U.S. citizen employees (regardless of title) are percentage points away from becoming Chinese "foreign officials?"

    The rise in sovereign wealth funds, particularly CIC, is not just a U.S. issue, as CIC has acquired substantial stakes in Canadian and Australian companies as well. Does that mean that a Canadian or Australian citizen can be a Chinese "foreign official?"

    The above questions are not merely hypotheticals and it seems ridiculous to think that the answers would be "yes" - but that would seem to be the answer if the enforcement agencies' dubious "foreign official" interpretation were applied in an intellectually honest fashion to the above questions.

    With foreign government owned sovereign wealth funds making investments around the world (including in U.S. companies) and with SOEs listing public shares on various exchanges and otherwise doing business around the world, there has never been a more critical time for the enforcement agencies to make clear its legal reasoning and support for its dubious legal theory.

Post Title

Sovereign Wealth Funds and the FCPA


Post URL

https://manufacturing-holdings.blogspot.com/2010/03/sovereign-wealth-funds-and-fcpa.html


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