Imagine I give a test to the 37 students in my class. However, because of reasons uniquely relevant to many of the students, not all students are equally capable of passing the test.
I hope all would view this test to be a bit empty.
This post summarizes the OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report and Transparency International's Annual Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
For reasons discussed below, these two report cards suffer from the same dynamic described in the above hypothetical.
In many OECD member countries there is no such thing as corporate criminal liability - or even if there is - such corporate liability can only be based on the actions of high-ranking executives or officers. This of course is materially different than in the U.S. where, under respondeat superior principles, a business organization can face legal liability (civil and criminal) based on the actions of any employee to the extent the employee was acting within the scope of his or her duties and to the extent the conduct was intended to benefit, at least in part, the organization.
In most OECD member countries prosecuting authorities have two choices - to prosecute or not to prosecute - there is no such thing as non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements (NPAs/DPAs). Not so in the U.S. where the majority of these alternative resolution vehicles are used to resolve FCPA enforcement actions. As the OECD itself stated in its Phase 3 Report of U.S. enforcement of the FCPA - "it seems quite clear that the use of these agreements is one of the reasons for the impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S." (See here for the prior post). Former DOJ FCPA enforcement chief Mark Mendelsohn was asked directly – if the DOJ “did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year,” and he stated as follows: “if the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal case or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases.”
In certain other OECD member countries, there is a compliance defense relevant to the prosecution of bribery and corruption offenses. (See here for the prior post).
Given these differing dynamics (among others), it is fairly obvious why OECD member countries have varying degrees of enforcement of bribery and corruption offenses.
With that in mind, on to the report cards.
Transparency International Progress Report 2011 - Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
On May 24th, Transparency International (TI) released (here) its seventh annual Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention.
The report "shows no improvement in the enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the past year and warns that this could signal a dangerous loss of momentum in the fight against corruption."
The report covers 37 countries and "shows that there are still only seven countries with active enforcement, nine with moderate enforcement, and 21 with little or no enforcement." Huguette Labelle, Chair of TI, stated that "the collective commitment to stamp out foreign bribery made by all OECD parties is undermined when a large number of countries have inadequate enforcement."
The introduction of the report includes the following statement.
"Continued lack of enforcement in 21 countries a decade after the Convention entered into force, notwithstanding repeated OECD reviews, clearly indicates lack of political commitment by their governments. And in some of those with moderate enforcement, the level of commitment is also uncertain. This is a danger signal because the OECD Convention depends on the collective commitment of all parties to ending foreign bribery."
The reports "major conclusions" include the following: "risk of loss of momentum" and "lack of political commitment."
As to the former, the report states as follows. "The Convention has not yet reached the point at which the prohibition of foreign bribery is consistently enforced. With little or no enforcement by half of the signatory governments, backsliding by enforcing governments is a serious threat. This concern is aggravated in a troubled global economy in which companies are scrambling for business. Business organisations have increasingly criticised anti-bribery enforcement as a competitive obstacle. The present position of the Convention is unstable, and unless forward momentum is recovered, the progress made in the past decade could unravel."
As to the "lack of political commitment", the report states as follows. "Reviews conducted by TI experts indicate that the principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political commitment by government leaders. In countries where there is committed political leadership, the OECD’s rigorous monitoring programme has helped improve laws and enforcement programmes. However, in the absence of political will, even repeated OECD reviews have little effect."
Once again, Canada received a public lashing from TI.
Under the heading "lack of progress in Canada," the report states as follows. "Canada is the only G7 country in the little or no enforcement category, and has been in this category since the first edition of this report in 2005. It is also the only OECD member that does not provide nationality jurisdiction, which presents a serious obstacle to enforcement. [...] TI welcomes that the government of Canada has publicly reported the number of investigations for the first time. It is promising that 23 foreign bribery investigations are under way. If these investigations lead to prosecutions, Canada may finally move out of the little or no enforcement category." (A future post will summarize the recent Canadian enforcement action against Niko Resources).
TI's 2010 report (see here for the prior post) included reference to many big picture enforcement issues such as the use of negotiated settlements (NPAs and DPAs), judicial scrutiny of enforcement actions, and the proper amount of fines and penalties. However, TI's 2011 report was silent as to many big picture issues.
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report
On April 20th, the OECD Working Group on Bribery released its annual report (here). The release (here) states as follows. "Most governments are not meeting their international commitments to clamp down on bribery and corruption in international business, with only five signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention having sanctioned individuals or companies in the past year."
I hope all would view this test to be a bit empty.
This post summarizes the OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report and Transparency International's Annual Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
For reasons discussed below, these two report cards suffer from the same dynamic described in the above hypothetical.
In many OECD member countries there is no such thing as corporate criminal liability - or even if there is - such corporate liability can only be based on the actions of high-ranking executives or officers. This of course is materially different than in the U.S. where, under respondeat superior principles, a business organization can face legal liability (civil and criminal) based on the actions of any employee to the extent the employee was acting within the scope of his or her duties and to the extent the conduct was intended to benefit, at least in part, the organization.
In most OECD member countries prosecuting authorities have two choices - to prosecute or not to prosecute - there is no such thing as non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements (NPAs/DPAs). Not so in the U.S. where the majority of these alternative resolution vehicles are used to resolve FCPA enforcement actions. As the OECD itself stated in its Phase 3 Report of U.S. enforcement of the FCPA - "it seems quite clear that the use of these agreements is one of the reasons for the impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S." (See here for the prior post). Former DOJ FCPA enforcement chief Mark Mendelsohn was asked directly – if the DOJ “did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year,” and he stated as follows: “if the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal case or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases.”
In certain other OECD member countries, there is a compliance defense relevant to the prosecution of bribery and corruption offenses. (See here for the prior post).
Given these differing dynamics (among others), it is fairly obvious why OECD member countries have varying degrees of enforcement of bribery and corruption offenses.
With that in mind, on to the report cards.
Transparency International Progress Report 2011 - Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
On May 24th, Transparency International (TI) released (here) its seventh annual Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention.
The report "shows no improvement in the enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the past year and warns that this could signal a dangerous loss of momentum in the fight against corruption."
The report covers 37 countries and "shows that there are still only seven countries with active enforcement, nine with moderate enforcement, and 21 with little or no enforcement." Huguette Labelle, Chair of TI, stated that "the collective commitment to stamp out foreign bribery made by all OECD parties is undermined when a large number of countries have inadequate enforcement."
The introduction of the report includes the following statement.
"Continued lack of enforcement in 21 countries a decade after the Convention entered into force, notwithstanding repeated OECD reviews, clearly indicates lack of political commitment by their governments. And in some of those with moderate enforcement, the level of commitment is also uncertain. This is a danger signal because the OECD Convention depends on the collective commitment of all parties to ending foreign bribery."
The reports "major conclusions" include the following: "risk of loss of momentum" and "lack of political commitment."
As to the former, the report states as follows. "The Convention has not yet reached the point at which the prohibition of foreign bribery is consistently enforced. With little or no enforcement by half of the signatory governments, backsliding by enforcing governments is a serious threat. This concern is aggravated in a troubled global economy in which companies are scrambling for business. Business organisations have increasingly criticised anti-bribery enforcement as a competitive obstacle. The present position of the Convention is unstable, and unless forward momentum is recovered, the progress made in the past decade could unravel."
As to the "lack of political commitment", the report states as follows. "Reviews conducted by TI experts indicate that the principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political commitment by government leaders. In countries where there is committed political leadership, the OECD’s rigorous monitoring programme has helped improve laws and enforcement programmes. However, in the absence of political will, even repeated OECD reviews have little effect."
Once again, Canada received a public lashing from TI.
Under the heading "lack of progress in Canada," the report states as follows. "Canada is the only G7 country in the little or no enforcement category, and has been in this category since the first edition of this report in 2005. It is also the only OECD member that does not provide nationality jurisdiction, which presents a serious obstacle to enforcement. [...] TI welcomes that the government of Canada has publicly reported the number of investigations for the first time. It is promising that 23 foreign bribery investigations are under way. If these investigations lead to prosecutions, Canada may finally move out of the little or no enforcement category." (A future post will summarize the recent Canadian enforcement action against Niko Resources).
TI's 2010 report (see here for the prior post) included reference to many big picture enforcement issues such as the use of negotiated settlements (NPAs and DPAs), judicial scrutiny of enforcement actions, and the proper amount of fines and penalties. However, TI's 2011 report was silent as to many big picture issues.
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report
On April 20th, the OECD Working Group on Bribery released its annual report (here). The release (here) states as follows. "Most governments are not meeting their international commitments to clamp down on bribery and corruption in international business, with only five signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention having sanctioned individuals or companies in the past year."
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